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COMMENTS
EXPANDING THE STANDARD FOR ATTEMPTS
TO MONOPOLIZE: THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW
OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES
I. INTRODUCTION
Prolonged debate has not resolved a major controversy in
antitrust law concerning the proper definition and scope of
the "attempt to monopolize" offense under section 2 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act.1 A majority of federal courts retain
the time-honored view that attempt liability will lie if defen-
dant's conduct evidenced a specific intent to monopolize and
defendant possessed sufficient market power to generate a
"dangerous probability" of actual monopolization.2 Certain
courts and commentators, however, would devitalize market
power considerations in attempt cases, focusing instead upon
the anticompetitive severity of defendant's conduct.' The
0 1981 by Timothy J. Buchanan.
1. Sherman Act § 2 provides in part:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or com-
bine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony ....
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
2. E.g., Harold Friedman, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 581 F.2d 1068, 1079 & n.14 (3d
Cir. 1978); Aviation Specialties, Inc. v. United Technologies Corp., 568 F.2d 1186,
1192 (5th Cir. 1978); Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Cincinnati Milacron, Inc., 562 F.2d
365, 373 (6th Cir. 1977); FLM Collision Parts, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 543 F.2d 1019,
1030 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1097 (1977); McDaniel v. General Motors
Corp., [1980-811 TRADE CASES (CCH) 1 63,043 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Edward J. Sweeney &
Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 243, 268 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Fiorino v. Turner,
476 F. Supp. 962, 963 (D. Mass. 1979); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F.
Supp. 384, 403 (D. Del. 1978). See generally Annot., 27 A.L.R. Fed. 762 (1976); 2 E.
KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTrIRUST LAW, § 13.1 (1980); 2 J. VAN KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST
LAWS & TRADE REGULATION § 9.01 (1978).
3. The Ninth Circuit's qualified rejection of the market power requirement is
discussed in connection with notes 49-65 infra.
Commentary critical of the majority approach includes 3 P. AREEDA & D. TUR-
NER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION
(1978) [hereinafter cited as AiwzmA & TURNER]; L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
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United States Supreme Court has consistently denied certio-
rari in attempt cases4 and thus has declined to settle the
issue.
In late 1977, President Carter created the National Com-
mission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures5
(hereinafter Commission). The President directed the Com-
mission to "study and make recommendation," "within the
framework of existing antitrust laws," on two general problem
areas: 1) reducing the time consumption of complex antitrust
cases and fashioning more effective remedies in such cases,
and 2) the desirability of maintaining various existing anti-
trust exemptions and immunities.' The appropriate scope of
attempted monopolization was one of several specific con-
cerns,7 and the President asked the Commission to consider
"simplification of the standards required to establish" the
offense.8
OF ANTITRUST 137-40 (1977); Cooper, Attempts and Monopolization: A Mildly Ex-
pansionary Answer to the Prophylactic Riddle of Section Two, 72 MICH. L. REV. 373
(1974); Baker, Section 2 Enforcement-The View From the Trench, 41 ANTITRUST
L.J. 613 (1972); Blecher, Attempt to Monopolize Under Section 2 of the Sherman
Act: "Dangerous Probability" of Monopolization Within the "Relevant Market", 38
GEo. WASH. L. REV. 215 (1969); Turner, Antitrust Policy and the Cellephane Cases,
70 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1956); Note, The Role of Attempt to Monopolize in Antitrust
Regulation: An Economic and Social Justification for a New Approach, 31 VAND. L.
REV. 309 (1978); Comment, The Attempt to Monopolize Charge: The Sherman Act's
Atrophied Arm, 48 Miss. L.J. 55 (1977); Note, Attempt to Monopolize Under the
Sherman Act: Defendant's Market Power as a Requisite to a Prima Facie Case, 73
COLUM. L. REv. 1451 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Market Power as Requisite]; Note,
Attempt to Monopolize: The Offense Redefined, 1969 UTAH L. REv. 704 (1969).
4. Recent denials of certiorari include Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 585 F.2d 381
(9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 936 (1979); Greyhound Computer Corp., Inc. v.
IBM, 559 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978); FLM Collision
Parts, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 543 F.2d. 1019 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1097 (1977); Yoder Bros., Inc. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347 (5th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1094 (1977).
The Supreme Court has not completely abdicated the field. In past decades the
Court has addressed the attempt offense, but the results have been inconclusive. See
notes 12-28 and accompanying text infra.
5. Exec. Order No. 12,022, 3 C.F.R. 155 (1977), as amended by Exec. Order No.
12,052, 3 C.F.R. 173 (1978), reprinted in 15 U.S.C. § 1 app., at 857 (Supp. II 1978).
The amendment increased the Commission's membership from 15 to 22.
6. Id. § 2(a)(1).
7. Other specific problem areas mentioned in the Executive Order were revision
of pleading and discovery practices, judicial control of dilatory behavior, amendment
of evidentiary practices, structural relief for violations, and nonjudicial alternatives
for resolution of complex cases. Monopolization and attempt to monopolize were evi-
dently the only substantive offenses to be considered. Id. § 2(a)(1)(i)-(vii).
8. Id. § 2(a)(1)(vi). The Commission was given six months from the time its
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The Commission issued its report" in January 1979. Of
fifteen chapters, one was devoted to revision of the prevalent
approach to the attempt offense. This comment will analyze
and assess the Commission's suggested revisions, focusing par-
ticularly on the recommended "balancing" approach whereby
defendant's market power and conduct are relevant but not
always controlling in determining "dangerous probability" of
success. It will be suggested that the Commission's proposal
will not simplify attempt litigation in a procedural sense but
is perhaps more attuned to the basic objectives of the Sher-
man Act than the current majority approach.
II. CURRENT JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO THE "DANGEROUS
PROBABILITY" REQUISITE
As previously noted, attempt to monopolize has tradition-
ally been viewed as requiring both specific intent to monopo-
lize and dangerous probability of success. The specific intent
requirement is unanimously accepted by the courts 0 and is
thus not critically discussed. Major debate has focused on the
dangerous probability requirement; this element was explicitly
the Commission's chief concern.11
Debate revolves around two central questions: First,
whether the dangerous probability requirement should be dis-
carded altogether, and second, if retained, whether the re-
quirement should be expanded to reach anticompetitive con-
duct undertaken by a firm with less than substantial market
power. The Commission's alternatives thus included retaining
the traditional market-power-oriented approach, eliminating
dangerous probability as a requisite element in attempt cases,
or revising the traditional definition of dangerous probability
members were selected to complete its work. Id. § 2(b).
9. REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION FOR THE REvIEw OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES (1979), reprinted
in ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp., Jan. 18, 1979) [hereinafter
cited as Commission Report].
10. The Supreme Court has made it clear that a specific intent to monopolize is
an essential ingredient of the attempt offense. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v.
United States, 345 U.S. 594, 626 (1953); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105
(1948); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905). See 2 E. KINTNER,
supra note 2, § 13.3, at 412; Cooper, supra note 3, at 392-400; Hawk, Attempts to
Monopolize-Specific Intent as Antitrust's Ghost in the Machine, 58 CORNELL L.
REv. 1121, 1135-49 (1973); Market Power as Requisite, supra note 3, at 1451.
11. Commission Report, supra note 9, at 144-45.
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by reducing the overriding importance of market power in the
classic approach. As discussed below, the Commission pre-
ferred expansion to rejection. Before considering the Commis-
sion's proposal, however, it is useful to summarize the com-
peting judicial interpretations of the dangerous probability
element.
A. The Traditional View: Dangerous Probability Measured
by Proximity to Actual Monopoly Power
1. Origins of dangerous probability: the Supreme Court.
Justice Holmes introduced the elements of attempted monop-
olization in Swift & Co. v. United States12 with the following
language:
Where acts are not sufficient in themselves to produce a
result which the law seeks to prevent-for instance, the
monopoly-but require further acts in addition to the
mere forces of nature to bring that result to pass, an in-
tent to bring it to pass is necessary in order to produce a
dangerous probability that it will happen .... But when
the intent and the consequent dangerous probability ex-
ist, this statute, like many others and like the common
law in some cases, directs itself against the dangerous
probability as well as against the completed result.1 s
Later in the same opinion, Holmes stated:
Not every act that may be done with intent to produce an
unlawful result is unlawful, or constitutes an attempt. It
is a question of proximity and degree."'
Though most courts have apprehended Swift as setting forth
a double-element prima facie case,'5 some courts and com-
mentators have seized upon the ambiguity and context of
12. 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
13. Id. at 396 (citing Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 177 Mass. 267, 272, 59 N.E. 55,
56 (1901)). Holmes wrote Peaslee as Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme
Court. The case recognized the criminal law distinction between preparation and
attempt:
[S]ome preparations may amount to an attempt. It is a question of de-
gree. If the preparation comes very near to the accomplishment of the
act, the intent to complete it renders it so probable that the act will be a
misdemeanor. ...
177 Mass. at 272, 59 N.E. at 56 (emphasis added). In Swift, Holmes claimed that the
same distinction applies to attempt cases under the Sherman Act. 196 U.S. at 402.
14. 196 U.S. at 402.
15. See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
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Holmes' words to argue that dangerous probability should not
be a sine qua non of the offense."6 More troubling was the
unexplicated meaning of "dangerous probability" and the con-
comitant evidentiary problem: could the element be inferred
from market power, wrongful conduct, or both?17
Subsequent Supreme Court opinions in this area have,
scarcely illuminated Swift. The few cases"8 that discuss at-
tempt have fallen into two general categories: 1) cases in
which the Court focused on the specific intent element' 9 and,
finding insufficient evidence to support the element, rejected
plaintiff's attempt claim without inquiring into dangerous
probability,' 0 and 2) cases in which monopoly power"2 in one
16. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals treatment of dangerous probability is
discussed in connection with notes 49-65 infra. See also L. SULLIVAN, supra note 3, at
137-38 (Holmes was stating the common law rationale for the specific intent require-
ment in attempt cases; dangerous probability flows from the evil intent alone); Hawk,
supra note 10, at 1126 n.21 (noting the ambiguity); Market Power as Requisite, supra
note 3, at 1454 (noting the ambiguity).
17. The Swift opinion gave no indication of possible criteria for determining
specific intent or dangerous probability. Defendants in Swift allegedly controlled
about 60% of the national trade in fresh meats. 196 U.S. at 391. The appeal, however,
concerned the sufficiency of a bill in equity, hence the Court did not consider the
evidentiary matters involved. This fact, of course, affects the precedential value of the
case in the attempt area. See Hawk, supra note 10, at 1125-26 & n.21.
18. A major reason for the paucity of Supreme Court cases on the attempt of-
fense is that attempt is usually charged in conjunction with other Sherman Act viola-
tions, especially that of actual monopolization under § 2. Though the Act sets forth
monopolization and attempt to monopolize as separate offenses, note 1 supra, and
the Supreme Court has indicated that the offenses are analytically distinct, see Stan-
dard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61 (1911), attempt often
merges into the monopolization offense at trial and on appeal. E.g., American To-
bacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 783 (1946). See also E. KiNTNzR, supra note
2, § 13.1, at 404-05.
19. In United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948), the Court
stated: "even though the restraint effected may be reasonable under § 1, it may con-
stitute an attempt to monopolize under § 2 if a specific intent to monopolize may be
shown." Id. at 531-32. The Court made no mention of the Swift dangerous
probability requirement, though such inquiry was not necessary since the Court
found no evidence of specific intent, Id. at 520-27. See also Times-Picayune Publish-
ing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 626-27 (1953).
20. "Dangerous probability" language has been used in only three Supreme
Court cases since Swift. In American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781
(1946), the Court expressly approved a jury instruction that included dangerous
probability as an element of attempted monopolization. Id. at 785, 815. Attempt was
not, however, an issue before the Court, as certiorari was explicitly limited to issues
surrounding actual monopolization. Id. at 782. The opinion is thus of questionable
authority in the attempt area. See Cooper, supra note 3, at 384 n.34; Market Power
as Requisite, supra note 3, at 1457.
In United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948), the Court quoted the Swift
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market has been used as leverage to obtain competitive ad-
vantages in another."2 The latter type primarily involves mis-
use of existing monopoly power 8 rather than the classic situa-
tion, apparently addressed in Swift, in which a firm with less
than monopoly power attempts to gain that power in a single
market.
As a result, the Court's opinions regarding dangerous
probability have been inconclusive. 24 The cases have been si-
lent beyond an occasional indirect 5 reminder that the ele-
ment exists and a perfunctory reference to Justice Holmes'
comments in Swift. The closest the Court has come to ex-
plaining the element was in dictum in a 1965 monopolization
case: 6 monopolization and attempts to monopolize require as-
sessment of defendant's market power in order to determine
"ability to lessen or destroy competition. 27  Dangerous
probability was not, however, discussed. 8 Largely by default,
"dangerous probability" language, but did so in elaborating the specific intent re-
quirement and not the dangerous probability element. Griffith is discussed in connec-
tion with notes 22-23 infra.
Finally, the Court quoted the Swift passage in Lorain Journal Co. v. United
States, 342 U.S. 143, 153 (1951). However, Lorain was a misuse of monopoly power
case, see notes 22-23 infra, thus the Court had no occasion to comment on the mean-
ing of dangerous probability.
21. The prevailing judicial interpretation of "monopoly power" is discussed be-
low. See notes 31-41 and accompanying text infra.
22. "[T]he use of monopoly power, however lawfully acquired, to gain a compet-
itive advantage, or to destroy a competitor, is unlawful." United States v. Griffith, 334
U.S. 100, 107 (1948). The point was repeated in Lorain Journal Co. v. United States,
342 U.S. 143, 154 (1951), and more recently in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States,
410 U.S. 366, 377 (1973).
23. See Hawk, supra note 10, at 1156-59. Professor Hawk argues that misuse of
monopoly power cases, such as United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948), should
be treated as "unique" offenses under § 2 of the Sherman Act. Hawk, supra note 10,
at 1158-59.
24. See E.J. Delaney Corp. v. Bonne Bell, Inc., 525 F.2d 296, 305 (10th Cir.
1975); Market Power as Requisite, supra note 3, at 1458.
25. The reminders have been indirect since the Court has never addressed or
explained the dangerous probability element. See notes 17-20 and accompanying text
supra.
26. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172
(1965).
27. Id. at 177. It should be noted that the Court has in dictum reached the
contrary conclusion that power inquiry is relevant only when actual monopolization is
alleged. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 n.23
(1956); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940). The
controversy surrounding the cryptic duPont footnote is discussed in note 53 infra.
28. Dangerous probability was not mentioned because attempt itself was men-
tioned only once in the brief opinion. Monopolization was evidently the only § 2 vio-
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the Court has left to lower federal courts the responsibility of
developing a coherent attempt analysis.
2. The lower federal court majority. Lower courts, fol-
lowing the lead of Justice Holmes' criminal law analogue,2e
have closely related the attempt offense to the definition of
completed monopolization. The result has been twofold: the
attempt offense requires a showing of specific intent to mo-
nopolize and dangerous probability of success; dangerous
probability exists when a defendant possesses market power
proximate to monopoly power.
The latter fold concerning the existence of a dangerous
probability is derived from Justice Holmes' proximity concept
and from the definition of monopolization. In United States
v. Grinell Corp.,1 the Supreme Court stated that monopoliza-
tion has two elements:
(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant
market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of
that power as distinguished from growth or development
as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen,
or historical accident.8 '
Thus, monopoly is not in itself proscribed, a conclusion that
runs consistently through judicial interpretation of the Sher-
man Act.88 Of paramount concern in attempt analysis is the
monopoly power element, since attempt is formulated in
terms of specific intent to monopolize and proximity to mo-
nopoly power.
lation alleged in the case. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp.,
382 U.S. 172, 174 (1965).
29. See note 13 supra.
30. 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 3, 820, at 312; Cooper, supra note 3, at
378-80.
31. 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
32. Id. at 570-71.
33. See, e.g., American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 813-14
(1946), quoting Judge Hand's influential opinion in the Alcoa case, United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427-32 (2d Cir. 1945); United States v. In-
ternational Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693, 708 (1927); United States v. U.S. Steel Corp.,
251 U.S. 417, 451 (1920).
Indication that monopoly power could, without more, be a § 2 violation was given
in United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948). See the well-known analysis of
the Griffith problem in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp.
295, 342 (D. Mass. 1953). In Grinnell, however, the Court solidified the idea that
mere existence of monopoly power, without more, is not monopolization. Beyond
power, it is unclear what the Court requires. n AEEDA & TURNER, supra note 3, 613,
at 34.
19811
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21
Monopoly power is the "power to control prices or ex-
clude competition,"" and is inferable from a "predominant
share of the market."85 Determination of "relevant market"
and of defendant's share of that market are thus crucial in
actual monopolization cases." Assuming the validity of the
criminal law analogy, it is logical to approach the dangerous
probability element of attempted monopolization in terms of
market share "dangerously close" to a predominant share.8 7 A
complete understanding of attempt thus requires examination
of judicial standards for determining what market shares are
considered "predominant" and the confusion that inevitably
surrounds determination of proximity to such predominance.
Since the influential United States v. Aluminum Co. of
Americas8 opinion, courts have developed a convenient guide-
line in monopolization cases to measure the predominance of
market share: shares in the neighborhood of seventy percent"
and up are inherently suspect and will likely fulfill the mo-
nopoly power requirement of that offense. In Supreme Court
cases, the lowest market share resulting in liability was sev-
enty percent, in United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. 0
34. United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
The Court has similarly stated that "the material consideration in determining
whether a monopoly exists is not that prices are raised and that competition actually
is excluded but that power exists to raise prices or to exclude competition when it is
desired to do so." American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811 (1946).
Market power in general is usually defined as "the ability to raise price by re-
stricting output." 2 AnwmA & TuRiwa, supra note 3, 501, at 322.
35. 384 U.S. at 571.
The question in all monopolization cases surrounds the definition of "predomi-
nant." See notes 37-41 infra.
Though market share is the most popular criterion for determining market
power, a comprehensive approach would probably add product differentiation, since
"[wlith physical differences, performance characteristics will vary to some degree, and
there is a higher likelihood that a substantial number of buyers will consider the one
product distinctly superior to the others." 2 AEmDA & TURN E, supra note 3, 504b,
at 326. This criterion was discussed in United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours &
Co., 351 U.S. 377, 392-93 (1956), and was more recently utilized in Continental T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 64 (1977) (White, J., concurring).
36. See United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 392-404
(1956); Hawk, supra note 10, at 1151.
37. See, e.g., Hawk, supra note 10, at 1154-55.
38. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
39. Market Power as Requisite, supra note 3, at 1460 & n.69. The 70% figure is
derived from Judge Hand's comment in Alcoa that, whereas a 90% market share is
"enough to constitute a monopoly. . . it is doubtful whether sixty or sixty-four per-
cent would be enough." 148 F.2d at 424. See also note 40 infra.
40. 334 U.S. 131 (1948). See generally Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc.,
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Thus, though the approach may seem arbitrary, it has led to a
fairly consistent theory of liability for completed
monopolization."
The same cannot be said of judicial approaches to at-
tempted monopolization. The interpretation of dangerous
probability in terms of proximity to monopoly has led the ma-
jority of courts to require that an attempt plaintiff plead and
prove defendant's market share as an element of the prima
facie case.42 The nebulous "proximity" concept, however, has
precluded meaningful standardization of market share analy-
sis in attempt cases. Something less than monopoly power is
required in most cases, but how much less is unclear.
Thus, while it can be said generally that most courts hold
market shares of greater than thirty percent 8 to generate a
dangerous probability of successful monopolization, some
courts have found market shares in the fifty to sixty percent
range insufficient." An indication of the confusion and incon-
sistency in the lower courts is the apparent requirement in
some courts that a defendant possess actual monopoly power
for dangerous probability to exist.' 5 This latter misconceived
417 F.2d 203, 207 n.2 (5th Cir. 1969).
41. Market Power as Requisite, supra note 3, at 1453.
42. In addition to the cases cited in note 2 supra, see, e.g., George R. Whitten,
Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547, 554 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 1004 (1975); Mullis v. Arco Petroleum Corp., 502 F.2d 290, 297 (7th Cir.
1974); Greenville Publishing Co. v. Daily Reflector, Inc., 496 F.2d 391, 399 (4th Cir.
1974).
43. Professor Cooper has stated that firms with market shares around 30% and
up "should start to worry about attempt liability." 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 3,
1 835c, at 349 & n.15, quoting E. Cooper, Dangerous Probability and Market Share
Analysis in Attempts to Monopolize, (paper delivered at Southwestern Legal Founda-
tion, February 12, 1976). Case law in the area generally supports Cooper's conclusion.
See, e.g., Harold Friedman, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 581 F.2d 1068, 1080 (3d Cir.
1978)(15.5% market share insufficient); Yoder Bros., Inc. v. California-Florida Plant
Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1368 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1094 (1977)(20%
share insufficient); Mullis v. Arco Petroleum Corp., 502 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1974)(3%
share insufficient); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384, 404 (D. Del.
1978)(35% share sufficient). But see Mowery v. Standard Oil Co. of Ohio, 463 F.
Supp. 762 (N.D. Ohio 1976)(33.3% share insufficient); Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo
Co., 403 F. Supp. 527, 534 (N.D. Ill. 1975)(market share "probably over 20%," suffi-
cient). See generally 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 3, 1 835, at 348-49.
44. United States v. Empire Gas Co., 537 F.2d 296, 305 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977)(shares of 50% and 47% insufficient); General Commu-
nications Eng'r, Inc. v. Motorola Communications & Elecs., 421 F. Supp. 274, 291-92
(N.D. Cal. 1976)(64% share insufficient); Diamond Int'l Corp. v. Walterhoefer, 289 F.
Supp. 550, 578 (D. Md. 1968)(51% share insufficient).
45. See United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296, 305 (8th Cir.
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approach obviates, of course, inquiry into proximity: defen-
dant must be virtually guilty of monopolization in order for
attempt liability to arise.
To summarize, the majority of courts require a plaintiff
to establish that defendant's market share is substantial
enough to create a dangerous probability of successful monop-
olization.4 6 In addition, plaintiff must prove that defendant
specifically intended to monopolize-usually evidenced cir-
cumstantially by anticompetitive conduct.47 Practically speak-
ing, courts usually determine attempt claims on the market
power analysis:' 8 if defendant's market share is regarded as
less than dangerous, inquiry into conduct is unnecessary, no
matter how anticompetitive such conduct may have been. It is
this anomaly that prompted judicial modification of market
power analysis in a minority of courts, most forcefully in the
Ninth Circuit.
Expansion: The Ninth Circuit Approach
The most explicit rejection of the traditional approach to
the attempt to monopolize has come in the Ninth Circuit. In
the seminal case, Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co.,4 the court ex-
pressly rejected dangerous probability as a necessary element
of attempted monopolization.8
In Lessig, a service station owner sued his supplier under
the Sherman and Clayton Acts alleging unlawful exclusive
dealing and tying arrangements, price fixing, and attempt to
monopolize. On the attempt issue, defendant argued that be-
cause plaintiff's evidence had not established a dangerous
probability of success in a relevant market, the attempt claim
must fail.5' The court stated:
1976)(citing Judge Hand's market power guideline for actual monopolization, see
notes 38-39 and accompanying text supra, in concluding that market shares of 50 and
47% were insufficient to establish dangerous probability); Dankese Eng'r, Inc. v. Ion-
ics, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 149, 152-53 (D. Mass. 1979)(attempted monopoly requires that
plaintiff establish the existence of monopoly power and an intent to monopolize).
46. See notes 2 & 42 supra.
47. See 3 ARmEDA & TuRNER, supra note 3, 1 822a, at 315 & n.4; Smith, Attempt
to Monopolize: Its Elements and Their Definition, 27 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 227, 230
(1958).
48. See Market Power as Requisite, supra note 3, at 1460.
49. 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964).
50. Id. at 474.
51. Id.
[Vol. 21
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We reject the premise that probability of actual monopo-
lization is an essential element of attempt to monopolize.
Of course, such a probability may be relevant circumstan-
tial evidence of intent, but the specific intent itself is the
only evidence of dangerous probability the statute
requires .... ss
The court added that the "relevant market is not in issue" in
attempt cases.58
The decision did not illuminate the intent issue, and, as
subsequent developments within the Ninth Circuit reveal, the
extent to which dangerous probability is important has been
disputed." Some cases have expressly required a showing of
dangerous probability,55 while others adhere to the Lessig
principle and see market power and dangerous probability as
relevant but not essential." As a result, the Lessig treatment
has been somewhat restricted within the circuit 7 and has
been expressly rejected by many courts outside the circuit.55
The most recent cases indicate that the Ninth Circuit re-
quires proof of dangerous probability, but that such proof
need not take the form of market power evidence.5' Thus, an
52. Id.
53. Id. (citing the monopolization case of United States v. E.I. duPont de
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 n.23 (1956)). The cryptic "footnote 23" of duPont
led Professor Turner to argue that market evidence is irrelevant in attempt and con-
spiracy cases under § 2 of the Sherman Act. Turner, supra note 3, at 281, 304-05
(1956). The footnote rejects several cases put forth by the government in favor of its
definition of the market in that case, some for the apparent reason that they involved
conspiracies or attempts to monopolize, in which case the relevant market is "not in
issue." Professor Turner's interpretation of the footnote has been disputed. See, e.g.,
Smith, supra note 47, at 240-44. The Ninth Circuit has been alone in adopting Pro-
fessor Turner's interpretation of the footnote.
54. See Kaye, Attempt to Monopolize in the Ninth Circuit: The Legacy of Les-
sig, 12 WILLAMEmrE L.J. 331, 344 (1976)("[T]he legacy of [Lessig] has, by and large,
been confusion.").
55. E.g., Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848 (9th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978); Cornwell Quality Tools Co. v. C.T.S. Co., 446
F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972).
56. E.g., Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 473 F.2d 328, 332 (9th Cir. 1972);
Hallmark Indus. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 489 F.2d 8, 12 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 932 (1974); Knutson v. The Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795, 814 (9th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977).
57. See, e.g., 3 AWMEDA & TURNER, supra note 3, 832, at 338-39 & nn.13-14.
58. Id. at 338 n.12.
59. E.g., Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 585 F.2d 381, 390 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. de-
nied, 440 U.S. 936 (1979); Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848,
853 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978); Purewater Resources v. Consoli-
dated Foods Corp., [1980-11 TRAn CA s (CCH) 63,064 (N.D. Cal. 1979). See gen-
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attempt plaintiff may prove such probability by "proof of spe-
cific intent to control prices or destroy competition in a por-
tion of the market. . . accompanied by predatory conduct to-
ward that end." 60 Apparently, such intent and conduct alone
create a dangerous probability of success.6' Nonetheless, inde-
pendent proof of dangerous probability is preferable," and if
plaintiff does not produce evidence of defendant's market
power then "he must demonstrate conduct which is clearly
threatening to competition or clearly exclusionary" in order to
prevail.'e
In sum, the Ninth Circuit has not categorically rejected
dangerous probability or market power as criteria for deter-
mining attempt liability. Sharing a view propounded in vary-
ing degrees by certain commentators in the field, 4 the Ninth
Circuit sees power and conduct as relevant, but in a case of
"clearly" anticompetitive conduct, the power inquiry may be
eschewed altogether. Presumably, the premise of this view is
that very strong evidence of specific intent and anticompeti-
tive conduct will, without more, create a dangerous
probability of success. The President's Commission recom-
mended a similar approach. 6
III. THE COMMISSION REPORT AND THE "SLIDING SCALE"
RECOMMENDATION
While reducing the complexity of antitrust litigation was
the Commission's overall concern,66 the report makes it clear
that in the attempt to monopolize area the primary concern
erally Sherman v. British Leyland, Ltd., 601 F.2d 429, 453 n.47 (9th Cir. 1979).
60. Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 853 (9th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978).
61. Id. at 853-54.
62. Id. at 854.
63. Id. at 854 n.4.
64. E.g., 3 ARMDA & TURNER, supra note 3, 1 836, at 350-55 (power evidence
relevant in all cases except those involving patently anticompetitive conduct); Baker,
supra note 3, at 620 (eliminate dangerous probability element); Blecher, supra note 3,
at 215 (eliminate dangerous probability element); Turner, supra note 3, at 281 (elimi-
nate market power inquiry); Note, supra note 3, at 704 (eliminate dangerous
probability element).
65. See notes 88-98 and accompanying text infra.
66. Exec. Order No. 12,022, 3 C.F.R. 155, 156 (1977), as amended by Exec. Or-
der No. 12,052, 3 C.F.R. 173 (1978), reprinted in 15 U.S.C. § 1 app., at 857 (Supp. II
1978). See text accompanying notes 6-8 supra.
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was effective antitrust enforcement. 7 Noting the inconsistent
judicial approaches to the attempt offense, the report states
that the Commission's main inquiry was into alleged impair-
ment of enforcement due to the "overly restrictive" standard
adopted by the majority of courts." Thus, the Commission as-
sessed testimony of persons who asserted that the market
power approach leaves certain forms of "plainly predatory"
conduct unchecked." Tempering the enforcement inquiry was
the fundamental notion that antitrust statutes "must not be
so broad as to deter legitimate, vigorous competitive
behavior.17 0
A. The "Lacuna" Problem
The Commission indicated that the prevailing interpreta-
tion of "dangerous probability" is "unnecessarily strict" and
"diminishe[s] the ability of Sherman Act Section 2 to reach
unilateral anticompetitive conduct."7' Since a business firm
with less than a twenty-five to thirty percent market share ap-
parently cannot be guilty of attempt, regardless of the an-
ticompetitive severity of its conduct,7' a gap arguably exists in
section 2 enforcement. Some commentators call this problem
the "lacuna" effect.78
The Commission illustrated the problem in United
States v. Empire Gas Co.,74 an Eighth Circuit opinion that
exemplifies the potential for injustice in the majority view.
The defendant in that case possessed possible market shares
of forty-seven and fifty percent in two separate product mar-
kets. 75 The government established a variety of predatory
practices that the firm used to coerce competitors into main-
taining prices at a high level.76 Despite this evidence, the
court could find no attempt liability since there was no pros-
67. Commission Report, supra note 9, at 144.
68. Id. at 144-45.
69. Id. at 145 & n.12.
70. Id. at 145.
71. Id. at 146.
72. See notes 43-48 and accompanying text supra.
73. E.g., Hawk, supra note 10, at 1152.
74. 537 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977).
75. Id. at 305.
76. The practices included threats to exclude competitors through "drastic"
price cuts, coupled with express statements of predatory intent. Id. at 299-302. On
these facts, the court had no problem finding specific intent to monopolize. Id. at 302.
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pect for monopoly control in the market.77 The Commission
found this case "troubling" in its steadfast adherence to the
proximity concept.78 Clearly, the Commission concluded, a
broader approach would better serve the Sherman Act policy
of safeguarding competition.
The Commission favored the position of the Seventh Cir-
cuit in Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc.,79
where the court rejected the view that attempt liability should
be based on actual likelihood of successful monopolization. 0
Instead,
it requires an appraisal of the alleged offender's ability to
achieve the forbidden result, his intent, and the nature of
his overt actions .... The ultimate concern is the firm's
actual or threatened impact on competition in the rele-
vant market.8 1
The Commission endorsed the "threatened impact" approach
taken in Kearney & Trecker as more effective than the mar-
ket power approach.8' The proper inquiry then, is whether de-
fendant's conduct "substantially threatens the maintenance of
competition," and the existence of such a threat creates the
requisite dangerous probability of success.8 The Commission
found the majority approach overly restrictive since blatantly
anticompetitive conduct may go unchecked. It found the
Kearney & Trecker view more consistent with Justice
Holmes' approach to attempt and with the modern, "far less
demanding" definitions of criminal attempt in general.84
77. Id. at 305, cited in Commission Report, supra note 9, at 147.
78. Commission Report, supra note 9, at 146.
79. 452 F.2d 579 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1066 (1972).
80. Id. at 598.
81. Id. quoted in Commission Report, supra note 9, at 147.
82. Commission Report, supra note 9, at 147.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 146-47. As evidence of "far less demanding" approaches, the Commis-
sion cited proposed Senate Bill 1437 and MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(c)(Proposed
Official Draft, 1962). Commission Report, supra note 9, at 146 n.17. While the pro-
posed criminal code reform expands present definitions of attempts in general, see
CRIMINAL LAW REP. (BNA) (Special Supp. June 14, 1978), at 19, the Model Penal
Code arguably does not. Section 5.01(1)(c) defines attempt in terms of "substantial
step" as opposed to "dangerous probability." However, § 5.01(2) requires that con-
duct be strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose in order to qualify as
"substantial step." Analytically, this may be very similar to dangerous probability.
One court, in fact, has so observed, at least with respect to attempted monopolization.
Unibrand Tire & Product Co. v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 429 F. Supp. 470, 477 (W.D.
N.Y. 1977).
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The Commission's recommended approach-over and
above its endorsement of Kearney & Trecker-is considered
below. Before that recommendation is set forth and assessed,
however, it should be noted that condemnation of Empire Gas
as representative of the "wrong" approach to attempts is mis-
leading. As noted previously,865 Empire Gas was based upon
the erroneous premise that actual monopoly power is neces-
sary to a finding of dangerous probability of success. Thus,
market shares in the forty-seven and fifty percent range were
considered insufficient since they do not constitute monopoly
power as it has been defined by the Supreme Court and Alcoa
cases.8 Most courts, however, would hold that market shares
in the Empire Gas range are sufficiently high to establish a
dangerous probability. 87 The case is thus not truly representa-
tive of the current majority view.
B. The "Sliding Scale" Solution
Having identified the "lacuna" problem in judicial con-
structions of the Sherman Act, the Commission briefly sum-
marized what it believed to be the appropriate view. In its en-
suing recommendation, the Commission urged courts to adopt
the new approach and offered Congress a suggested amend-
ment to section 2 that included the favored standard.8
The Commission succintly stated its recommended ap-
proach as follows:
[T]he more unambiguously anticompetitive the conduct
and the clearer the presence of the requisite specific in-
tent, the less important is the defendant's present or
probable market position.89
Thus, clearly anticompetitive conduct could determine dan-
gerous probability of success "without lengthy market analy-
sis."9 Such conduct, defined as "conduct that cannot serve
any competitive purpose and is inherently destructive to com-
petition," 91 assures a substantial anticompetitive effect when
85. See note 45 and accompanying text supra.
86. See notes 37-40 and accompanying text supra.
87. See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
88. Commission Report, supra note 9, at 150-51, 165-66.
89. Id. at 148.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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undertaken by any firm.
Conversely, proof of present or potential market domi-
nance necessitates inquiry into a "broader range of factors
* * , to evaluate the impact of the defendant's activities on
competition. . . ."" Though this point was not elaborated, it
apparently means that as power increases, conduct need be
less clearly anticompetitive for liability to arise.9
Although the Commission referred to its approach as
"balancing,' 4 the same concept has been called a "sliding
scale" by most commentators.' The gist of the view is that
the significance of market position is inversely related to the
invidious nature of the conduct." But regardless of the label,
the Commission confidently stated that the approach would
reach conduct such as that in the Empire Gas case, "even
when [such conduct is] undertaken by a firm with less than a
dominant position.' 7 In addition, the new standard could
"serve to expedite litigation concerning such conduct since the
volume of evidence relating to market position [would] be
reduced."' 8
A few initial observations may be made. First, the Com-
mission did not reject the "dangerous probability" require-
ment. On the contrary, the report notes that the element is
useful in shedding light on the defendant's intent and limiting
attempt to "cases in which the potential anticompetitive im-
pact of the defendant's conduct is truly significant."" Danger-
ous probability was, however, expanded beyond the prevalent
market power approach to include cases where conduct is
"unambiguously anticompetitive" despite defendant's market
position.
Next, the report arguably does not suggest a "pure" slid-
ing scale approach: market power and invidiousness of con-
92. Id. at 149.
93. This interpretation is based on the traditional or "pure" sliding scale ap-
proach, under which conduct and power are inversely related. See note 96 and accom-
panying text infra.
94. Commission Report, supra note 9, at 148.
95. See, e.g., 2 E. KiNTNm, supra note 2, at 423 n.121; 3 ARwaDA & TURNER,
supra note 3, 834b, at 344-45; Market Power as Requisite, supra note 3, at 1473.
96. See 2 E. KiNTNEr, supra note 2, at 423 n.121; 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra
note 3, 1 834b, at 344.
97. Commission Report, supra note 9, at 148-49.
98. Id. at 149.
99. Id. at 146.
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duct are not in every case quantified and somehow related on
a magical scale of importance. Market power inquiry is "ap-
propriate" when defendant's conduct is "competitively ambig-
uous," that is, when the anticompetitive effect is speculative
or disputable. 00 The result is that evidence of market power
will be crucial in most cases since conduct is usually traceable
to at least a few legitimate business practices. Thus, the ap-
proach does not purport to "split hairs" over liability in the
cases between the extremes: unless plaintiff presents strong
evidence of clearly anticompetitive conduct, market analysis
must be made.
Finally, the Commission's sliding scale approach appears
quite similar to the approach taken by the most recent Ninth
Circuit cases. As the Janich'01 case revealed, dangerous
probability can be shown in two ways: proof of substantial
market power, or proof of predatory conduct so strongly sup-
portive of specific intent that dangerous probability is guaran-
teed despite lack of market power in the traditional sense.102
If plaintiff relies solely upon defendant's conduct, however,
such conduct must be clearly threatening to competition or
clearly exclusionary to generate liability. 03 This approach is
identical to the Commission's view that market power evi-
dence is appropriate unless defendant's conduct is "unam-
biguously anticompetitive."
The preceding discussion reveals that the Commission's
position could actually be termed "modified," as opposed to
"pure," sliding scale.0'4 In the vast majority of cases, market
analysis will be necessary and dangerous probability will in
fact be determined by market share. Nevertheless, in certaih
cases such inquiry may be eschewed when conduct alone "sig-
nificantly threatens" competition.
100. Id. at 148.
101. Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978).
102. See notes 59-63 and accompanying text supra.
103. See notes 62-63 and accompanying text supra.
104. The labels are the author's and are used only for convenient distiction be-
tween the two approaches. Professors Areeda and Turner refer to their revised ap-
proach, which is similar to "modified" sliding scale, as a "limited per se rule." 3
AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 3, 1 836, at 350-55.
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ASSESSMENT: SERVING THE GOALS OF THE SHERMAN ACT
The Commission's sliding scale approach is not without
shortcomings. The two strongest arguments opposing the slid-
ing scale are set forth below, followed by a brief discussion of
the basic goals of the Sherman Act and the report's compati-
bility with those goals.
C. Assessment of Opposing Arguments
1. Expediting litigation. Though the Commission's cen-
tral concern in the attempt area was effective antitrust en-
forcement, 10 5 it additionally asserted that the sliding scale ap-
proach could expedite litigation in some cases because of the
abandonment of complex market analysis010 This conclusion
is erroneous. First, as noted above,0 7 market analysis would
be required in nearly all cases since firms are usually careful
to avoid conduct that is "unambiguously anticompetitive."
Second, in those cases where market power analysis can be
avoided, plaintiff can get to the jury on the conduct issue,
whereas under the current majority view, a plaintiff who dis-
penses with pleading defendant's market share will suffer ad-
verse summary judgment on the merits.10 8 Finally, as Profes-
sor Austin has pointed out, the test would likely "inflate
rather than expedite litigation"10' since analysis could not
stop, as it does now in the majority of courts, with a determi-
nation of insufficient market share. The "anticompetitive po-
tential" of defendant's conduct would require assessment in
any case. One observer estimated that, in monopolization
cases, litigation of the conduct element constitutes thirty-five
to forty-five percent of trial time;110 clearly, if conduct must
105. Commission Report, supra note 9, at 143-44.
106. Id. at 149.
107. See text accompanying note 103 supra.
108. See notes 42-46 and accompanying text supra. The exception, of course, is
the Ninth Circuit, where an attempt plaintiff may prove dangerous probability by
strong evidence of specific intent to monopolize. See notes 59-63 and accompanying
text supra.
109. Austin, The National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and
Procedures: Reports on Symptoms but Ignores Causes, 54 NoTm DAmE LAW. 873,
875 (1979).
110. Dougherty, Elimination of the "Conduct" Requirement in Government
Monopolization Cases: A Proposed Revision of the Sherman Act, 10 ANTITRUST LAW
& EcONoMicS Rv., No. 3, 37, 40 (1978). The article consists of the author's testimony
before the President's Commission.
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be assessed, trials will be longer and more complex than
before. Nevertheless, as the Commission itself noted, reduc-
tion of complexity often must be subordinated to effective an-
titrust enforcement.11'
2. Sliding Scale would "Chill" Aggressive Competition.
The most pervasive criticism of the sliding scale approach is
that the focus on conduct instead of market power could
"chill" legitimate, aggressive business conduct. 1 2 Since defen-
dant's power would not be an essential element of the attempt
claim, aggressive price cutting or other stiffly competitive be-
havior could result in unwarranted criminal or treble damage
liability. As a result, firms would be discouraged from compet-
ing effectively and the antitrust policy favoring competition
would be undermined.113
This objection is forceful if "pure" sliding scale is the
test. It is entirely unrealistic to assume that courts and juries
could effectively arrive at the proper balance of power and
conduct in any of the infinite combinations of factual situa-
tions presented to them. The potential for incursion into vig-
orous and legitimate competition is far too great in the many
cases involving "ambiguous" firm behavior.
A "modified" approach, arguably endorsed by the Com-
mission," 4 mitigates this effect if properly applied. Market
analysis should be dispensed with only if a firm's conduct is
truly unambiguously anticompetitive. An example frequently
cited is fraudulent procurement of a patent:"' such conduct
111. Commission Report, supra note 9, at 143. The Commission noted that the
Supreme Court has at times taken the view that enforcement is more desirable than
simplification. For example, in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S.
36 (1977), the Court abandoned a per se rule laid down in a prior antitrust case.
Abandoning such a rule was "correct," but ensured extensive complication of litiga-
tion. Commission Report, supra note 9, at 143 n.4 (citing Pitofsky, The Sylvania
Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78 COLUM. L. Rav. 1, 2-
3, 37-38 (1978)).
112. See, e.g., 3 ARmA & TuRNmR, supra note 3, 1 834c at 345; Austin, supra
note 109, at 876: Hawk, supra note 10, at 1155; Hibner, Attempts to Monopolize: A
Concept in Search of Analysis, 34 A.B.A. ANTrrrrusT L.J. 165, 168-77 (1967); Market
Power as Requisite, supra note 3, at 1473.
113. The Supreme Court has indicated that firms should not suffer antitrust
liability for conduct "predominantly motivated by legitimate business aims." Times-
Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 627 (1953). The Commission
expressly endorsed this policy. See text accompanying note 120 infra.
114. See notes 100-05 and accompanying text supra.
115. E.g., 3 AKMEDA & TURNER, supra note 3, 1 836, at 350; Cooper, supra note
3, at 447. In Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chem. Corp., 382
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cannot be interpreted in any favorable antitrust light and has
a high potential for excluding competition and inflating or
achieving substantial market power.11 In cases where conduct
is ambiguous, the problem of market power is more
troublesome.
The report should be interpreted as requiring market
analysis and substantial market share in cases of ambiguous
firm conduct. The Commission noted that in such cases mar-
ket structure, defendant's power, and "similar indicia of abil-
ity to monopolize... will greatly affect the conduct's impact
on competition. 11 7 Moreover, the report notes that when the
effect of certain conduct on competition is unclear, "danger-
ous probability of monopolization should prevent Section 2
from being used to curtail legitimate behavior."1 8 Finally, the
Commission, noting testimony urging adoption of standards
that would be "carefully tailored to ensure that the results are
not actually anticompetitive,"119 declared that the new stan-
dard should protect from liability "aggressive behavior that
increases competition in a market and benefits consumers
even at the expense of particular competitors.'"1 10 These com-
ments, in conjunction with language discussed previously, am-
ply support the position that market analysis should be ap-
plied when conduct is ambiguous in order to avoid the
"chilling" effect feared by critics."'1
U.S. 172 (1965), the Supreme Court indicated that fraudulent patent procurement
could give rise to antitrust liability.
116. 3 AREEDA & TuRNER, supra note 3, 836, at 350.
117. Commission Report, supra note 9, at 148 (emphasis added).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 149 n.28.
120. Id. at 149 (emphasis added).
121. Critics of "sliding scale" sometimes argue that elimination or minimization
of market power analysis will result in Sherman Act liability for the "lesser sin" of
unfair competition. Cooper, supra note 3, at 455. Remedies for unfair competition are
provided in the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976), and
state law. It is argued that these remedies adequately protect against anticompetitive
practices of relatively powerless firms.
The arguments, however, seem unconvincing. The FTC Act empowers the FTC
to issue cease and desist orders, make rules, and seek civil penalties for knowing vio-
lations of FTC Rules. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b), (1), (m) (1976). The FTC Act, however, does
not afford a private right of action and the courts have as yet been unwilling to imply
one. See FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 25-26 (1929); Holloway v. Bristol-Meyers Corp.,
485 F.2d 986, 988-92 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Thus, the FTC must initiate proceedings
against alleged violators; it clearly has insufficient resources to prosecute all claims.
The Act is thus less effective to reach anticompetitive conduct than the Sherman Act.
Private enforcement under the latter is guaranteed by the Clayton Act § 3, 15 U.S.C.
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The "chilling" effect argument is thus exaggerated when
applied to properly interpreted "modified" sliding scale. If
courts apply this standard with the prudence recommended
by the Commission, legitimate business behavior should not
be deterred.
D. Compatibility with Antitrust Policy
Examination of the federal antitrust policy supports a
"modified" sliding scale approach to attempted monopoliza-
tion. Chief Justice Hughes once characterized the Sherman
Act as a "charter of freedom" whose adaptability over time is
comparable to that of the Constitution.22 The Act embodies
principles of economic egalitarianismss that the Supreme
Court has recognized as "the freedom to compete-to assert
with vigor, imagination, devotion, and ingenuity whatever eco-
nomic muscle [a business] can muster."1 4 The almost sacro-
sanct goal of the legislation is the preservation of competition
through proscription of anticompetitive economic behavior. '1 5
The evils to which the Act is directed are unreasonable
restraints of trade and unlawful monopolies. Monopoly is fun-
damentally anticompetitive in most cases and is an inefficient
allocation of society's resources. 1'  The high prices and re-
stricted production associated with monopoly present a seri-
ous threat to the welfare of the consuming public; "7 the Sher-
§ 15 (1976).
Moreover, the fact that the Sherman Act and state laws respecting unfair tradepractices may to an extent overlap is irrelevant to the question of whether the federal
remedy applies. If the federal antitrust policy embraces proscription of certain an-
ticompetitive conduct, see notes 122-40 and accompanying text infra, then a federol
cause of action should lie.
122. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933). See
also United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972)(Sherman Act is the
"Magna Carta of free enterprise"); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S.
1, 4 (1958)(Act is a "charter of economic liberty"); H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL Am-
TRUST POLICY: ORGANIZATION OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION 608 & n.32 (1954).
123. H. THoRmaI, supra note 122, at 565-68, 608.
124. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
125. See Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, 422 U.S. 659, 689 (1975); North-
ern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958); American Column & Lumber
Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 400 (1921).
126. See C. KAYSEN & D. TuRNER, AmTrusT POLICY: AN EcONOMIC AND LEGAL
ANALY SS 33, 194 (1959).
127. See Justice Stone's review of the public welfare foundation in the ShermanAct's legislative history, in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 & n.15
(1940).
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man Act is directed to alleviation of such potential dangers.
Thus, economic theory has virtually established a presump-
tion that not only monopolies but all impairments to competi-
tion are harmful. 128 Monopolies are seen as merely the most
intractable form of anticompetitive behavior, synonomous
with unjustified power.12 9
Prevailing judicial interpretations of the Sherman Act
have established two guiding propositions: First, the Act pro-
tects competition, not competitors.8 0 The fact that a competi-
tor has succumbed to the forces of the marketplace is by itself
irrelevant to antitrust policy. The fact that competitors have
been excluded by improper conduct is, however, relevant.181
Second, size is not, in and of itself, violative of section 2 in the
absence of unlawful conduct.18 ' A firm with monopoly power,
however, must conduct itself more prudently than a firm with
a lesser market share due to anticompetitive potential.133
The modified sliding scale approach is in accord with his-
toric antitrust principles and policies. An expansion of the
current interpretation of section 2 would reach blatantly an-
ticompetitive conduct that the statute was designed to pre-
vent,"' while the retention of dangerous probability and re-
definition of that element in terms of significant threat posed
by unjustifiable business conduct is workable if applied
carefully. 135
128. A. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A
STUDY OF COMPETITION ENFORCED BY LAW 17 (2d Ed. 1970).
129. W. LETWIN, LAW AND EcONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA 59 (1965).
130. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962). The point, now
virtually a truism, was repeated more recently in Tower Tire & Auto Center, Inc. v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 392 F. Supp. 1098, 1106 (S.D. Tex. 1975) and Overseas Motors,
Inc. v. Import Motors Ltd., 375 F. Supp. 499, 541 & n.149 (E.D. Mich. 1974). The
latter case noted that "inquiry to the individual entrepreneur's competitive position
is of concern only as it is indicative of a concomitant public injury." Id. at 541 n.149.
131. See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 401,
rehearing denied, 333 U.S. 869 (1948)(concerted action to fix prices unlawfully deters
competition).
Consistent with a "modified" sliding scale, the anticompetitive effect of such ex-
clusion must be more than de minimis. That is, in most cases, exclusion of competi-
tors by firms with insignificant market shares will have no significant anticompetitive
effect. See notes 100-05, 114-21 and accompanying text supra; 3 AREEDA & TURNER,
supra note 3, 829a, at 329. Likewise, exclusion absent evidence of specific intent to
monopolize would not be actionable.
132. See note 31 supra.
133. See 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 3, 829, at 329-33.
134. See note 125 and accompanying text supra.
135. Careful application necessitates "modified" and not "pure" sliding scale.
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The core problem in any case will be to determine what
conduct unambiguously and significantly threatens competi-
tion. Elimination of competitors is not necessarily anticompe-
titive, but such elimination, coupled with strong independent
evidence of specific intent to monopolize, may amount to an
attempt. Price cutting is not in itself anticompetitive,' Re but in
certain cases it could be deemed "predatory" and hence inher-
ently injurious to competition.1 37 Use of predatory pricing, re-
fusals to deal, or other unilateral anticompetitive conduct to
increase market share from, for example, five to twenty-five
percent, would probably generate liability for attempt under
the new guidelines, whereas under the present majority ap-
proach it would not." '
To summarize, determination of attempt liability under
the proposed approach will depend upon the nature of defen-
dant's conduct and its overall effect on competition. In assess-
ing anticompetitive effect on a case-by-case basis, courts that
follow the precepts of Sherman Act policy will be able to
avoid such untoward results as punishing firms for vigorous
competition or operating efficiency.
IV. CONCLUSION
The basic principle of antitrust law is the enforcement of
competition by deterring anticompetitive business behavior.
Ultimately, the consumer reaps the benefit of this policy in
the form of lower prices and efficient resource allocation. 8 9
The Sherman Act is inherently vague 4 0 and the courts have
See notes 100-05, 114-21 and accompanying text supra.
136. Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 120 (1948).
137. Determination that a practice is "predatory" generally depends on a num-
ber of complex factors, but precise definitions are disputed. See generally 3 AREEDA
& TURNER, supra note 3, 11 711-22, at 150-94 (1978); R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARA-
DOX 144 (1978).
138. See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
139. Professor Bork asserts that the only legitimate antitrust goal is maximiza-
tion of consumer welfare. R. BORK, supra note 142, at 51. Bork defines "competition"
as "any state of affairs in which consumer welfare cannot be increased by judicial
decree." Id. See also M. FORKOSCH, ANTITRUST AND THE CONSUMER (1956).
140. See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 489 (1940); W. LETWIN,
supra note 129, at 14-15, 278. The vagueness of the statute has been attacked on
constitutional grounds. The Supreme Court, in Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373(1913), upheld the Sherman Act against a vagueness attack, but the arguments are
periodically reasserted. See, e.g., Note, Is the Sherman Act Unconstitutionally
Vague as a Criminal Statute? A Re-evaluation After Gypsum, 13 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
1981] 169
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been delegated the responsibility of developing a workable ap-
proach to antitrust law consistent with the goal of preserving
competition.14 1
The prevalent judicial approach to section 2 abdicates
this responsibility by guaranteeing that severely anticompeti-
tive conduct will not be checked in the absence of a large mar-
ket share. The Commission's recommendation, if interpreted
as "modified" sliding scale, could resuscitate effective anti-
trust enforcement in the area by reaching such conduct de-
spite defendant's actual inability to achieve full monopoly
power. Careful judicial application could thus ensure a proper
scope for the Sherman Act.
Timothy J. Buchanan
1284 (1979).
141. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 489 (1940); W. LgrwIN, supra
note 129, at 278.
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